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In this paper we investigate whether small-scale businesses face ¯nancial con-
straints that a®ect their survival. We develop a model of moral hazard in which
¯nancial constraints arise endogenously. The model predicts that higher private as-
sets relax ¯nancial constraints and have a positive e®ect on the ¯rm's probability of
survival. We test this proposition using German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
data, which cover the period 1984{2004. The release from ¯nancial constraints is
measured by inheritance. The empirical analysis con¯rms that the entrepreneur
has a higher propensity to stay in business when she inherits capital. This e®ect is
particularly strong for entrepreneurs that switch from self-employment into wage
employment. These results are consistent with hypothesis that ¯nancial frictions
have a perceptible impact on bankruptcy among small business ¯rms.
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11 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that the signi¯cant
positive correlation between companies' investment decisions and cash °ow in the US is
a sign of imperfections in capital markets. As ¯nancial constraints prevent ¯rms from
reaching their optimal capitalization, investment policies are largely determined by the
amount of internally-created funds. Although investment sensitivity to cash °ows has
received considerable attention, there is much less work on the link between ¯nancial
constraints and a ¯rm's business activity.1 The departure from the optimal investment
path in°uences not only the correlation between cash °ow and investment expenditure,
but it also a®ects the ¯rm's survival. The aim of this paper is to examine the hypothesis
that ¯nancial constraints determine the duration of the ¯rm's lifetime.
The majority of the vast literature on the relationship between ¯nancial constraints
and investment employs balance-sheet data of fairly large and listed ¯rms. At the same
time a relatively scarce research has been done for small-scale non-listed enterprises,
which are considered as one of the most important contributors to more employment and
growth (Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 2005).2 The main scope of this paper is to investigate
the e®ects of ¯nancial constraints on small-scale companies survival. Our study is based
on socio-economic data of German entrepreneurs. These data are more appropriate for
investigating small-scale entrepreneurial ¯rms than pure balance sheet data, because
these ¯rms are rarely managed by executive employees. Furthermore, their performance
is highly dependent on the entrepreneur's personality and socio-economic environment.
In a world with symmetric information and complete contracting would neither
agency con°icts nor control problems exist. Financial constraints are absent not only at
the start of the business but also during the its lifetime. However, in reality asymmetric
information prevails, contracts are incomplete and moral hazard occurs (Cressy, 2002).3
Borrowing constraints arise to the extent to which intermediaries are not able to identify
the entrepreneur's risk and her propensity to cheat. While investment of the entrepre-
2neur's own capital reduces the cheating incentive (Aghion and Bolton, 1996), pledg-
ing collateral ensures the intermediary against a total loss of its claim at a later date
(Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Thus, in the presence of borrowing constraints, the entre-
preneur's wealth is likely to correlate positively with start-up decision. The empirical
link between wealth and business foundation has been studied extensively. Most authors
con¯rm a positive correlation (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Evans and Leighton
(1989) on the US and Black, de Meza and Je®reys (1996) on Britain).
The question of whether ¯nancial constraints continue in the years after the start-up
of the business has received much less attention. The ¯ndings so far are controversial.
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) report a positive correlation in their study on
the US, while Cressy (1996b) suggests that personal assets at start-up do not have signif-
icant e®ect on survival of British start-ups after controlling for individual characteristics.
To the best of our knowledge, none of these studies investigate the e®ect of exogenous
increase in wealth on start-up survival in a bank-based economy, such as Germany. The
absence of this literature is especially striking since \... venture capital and mezzanine
¯nance, essentially debt with equity-like features are still rare in Germany."4.
In our study we develop a model of moral hazard and credit constraints closely
related to Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001). The model yields the hypothesis that
availability of private assets increases the entrepreneur's probability to survive. We test
this proposal by using the GSOEP data set. In order to make the wealth variation
variable exogenous to the entrepreneur's decision we use inheritance as the proxy for an
increase in private assets.5 This empirical strategy follows Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) who
test for the importance of credit constraints by examining a sample of US individuals
containing personal data of 1985 and 1987 and inheritance data of 1982 and 1983. They
¯nd that entrepreneurs who receive inheritances are more likely to remain in business
and their revenues are substantially higher.
We ¯nd that exogenous wealth variations in°uence the survival of businesses.6 In
particular inheritance exerts a signi¯cantly positive e®ect on the survival probability of
3small-scale businesses, indicating that the reception of the inheritance allows entrepre-
neurs to overcome the problem of under-capitalization. Interestingly, there is distinct
impact of inheritance on di®erent transition paths. Entrepreneurs that switch from
self-employment into employment experience an enhancement in their survival proba-
bility. However, inheritance fails to have a signi¯cant impact on the survival of their
counterparts' transition into unemployment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the
theoretical background. Section 3 illustrates the econometric model and presents the
estimation results; and ¯nally, Section 4 outlines conclusions and proposes areas of
further research.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs of type µi. Each entrepreneur chooses
a project that lasts two periods and needs in every period an investment of size I. In
any period, the project has two possible quality levels. The high quality project, h-
project, pays ph(I;µi)X > 0, and the low quality project, l-project, pays pl(I;µi)Y > 0,
where ph(I;µi) > pl(I;µi) 8I. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the return from
l-project is ¯xed to pl(I; ¹ µ)Y . The outcome of the h-projects is a function of entrepre-
neurial abilities, ph(I;µi)X with µi = ® ¹ µ, where @ph=@µ > 0. The standard concave
relationship between p j2fl;hg and investment I is assumed, @pj=@I > 0, @2pj=@I2 < 0:
Furthermore, the project will fail with certainty if the entrepreneur invests nothing,
pj(0) = 0. At the end of each period all pro¯ts of the project are distributed as divi-
dends and unsuccessful entrepreneurs leave the market. We assume that investment in
project h is socially desirable:7
Assumption 1.
ph=pl > Y=X 8 I:
4The entrepreneur who is endowed with project qualities such that
ph(I;µi)=pl(I; ¹ µ) = Y=X is considered a benchmark case and denoted as type µi = ^ µ.
To ¯nance his project, each entrepreneur borrows from one bank. Borrowing con-
tracts last only one period. There is a continuum of perfectly competitive risk neutral
banks which face a perfectly elastic supply of funds. For simplicity of analysis, the inter-
est rate is normalized to zero. Banks know the values of all model parameters, but they
cannot observe the entrepreneur's choice of quality level in the ¯rst period. Thus, at the
beginning of a relationship, they cannot deter the entrepreneur from choosing a project
quality that is unfavorable for the bank. However, given that there is a relationship in
period 1 and that banks invest the cost S at the beginning of period 2, they can screen
out the l-project in period two.
While the entrepreneur lacks liquid funds, she owns some amount A of private assets.
If the outstanding debt is secured and bankruptcy occurs, the bank seizes the entrepre-
neur's private assets. The asset's liquidation causes transaction costs of (1 ¡ ¯)A with
¯ 2 [1;0).
Let hIR;Ai represent a standard debt contract with initial investment I, repayment
rate R and collateral A. The bank is protected from the consequences of a failed project
only by pledged assets A. Thus, it o®ers the contract hIR;Ai only if the expected return
Bj = pjRI + (1 ¡ pj)¯A ¡ I ¸ 0.
Let Ej denote the entrepreneur's expected net pro¯t of a project from a contract
hRI;Ai. Then the expected pro¯t is Eh = ph(X ¡ RI) ¡ (1 ¡ ph)A with choice h and
El = pl(Y ¡ RI) ¡ (1 ¡ pl)A with choice l.
Our aim is to demonstrate that assets are crucial for survival. In doing so, we need
to establish that in order to break even banks will deter entrepreneurs from their opti-
mal investment by rationing with respect to project size. Consequently, we restrict our
attention to values of µ for which a restriction of the loan size I occurs. We now proceed
to show that there is a range of parameter values µ for which some entrepreneurs are
¯nancially constrained, yet constraints can be relaxed by pledging private assets. To do
5this, we ¯rst characterize the conditions of equilibrium. Then we describe the bench-
mark case of entrepreneurs who have no private assets: A = 0. In the third step, we
derive the relationship between assets and ¯nancial constraints in period 1. Note that
in the ¯rst period there is no screening option, as it can arise only from an already exist-
ing bank-client relationship. In the fourth step, we analyze the impact of the screening
option on the relation between assets and survival. Proofs of propositions are given in
the Appendix.
Period 1
In equilibrium the following conditions are satis¯ed:
C1: Participation constraint of banks. Bj ¸ 0,
C2: Pro¯t maximization by the entrepreneur. maxI;A Ej,
C3: Incentive compatibility constraint.
Eh(IRh;A) ¸ El(IRh;A) and (1)
Eh(^ IRh;A) ¸ El(I
¤
l Rl) or (2)
Eh(^ IRh;A) · El(I
¤
l Rl) (3)
C4: No entry of banks. Bj = 0,
where ^ I denotes the investment volume that establishes indi®erence between h and l,
and I¤
l is the optimal investment if banks only o®er a contract, that enables them to
break even with the l-project. We assume that the entrepreneur chooses h in case of
indi®erence between the two qualities.
If the contract violates (1), but satis¯es (2) in C3 the entrepreneur chooses quality
l according to C2, and the bank experiences a loss. C1 implies that such a contract
will never be o®ered in equilibrium. Also, no new banks enter the credit market in
equilibrium. Thus, C1 and C4 are only compatible if Bj = 0 and R = (I ¡ (1 ¡
6pj)¯A)=(pjI). If the contract satis¯es (1), but violates (2) the entrepreneur would prefer
a contract which allows a bank to make a small pro¯t on the low quality to a contract that
satis¯es (1). New banks could enter the market by o®ering such a contract. Therefore
C1 and C4 are only compatible if the bank o®ers a single contract that allows it to break
even with the l-project. According to C3, quality h is realized if, and only if,
ph(X ¡
I ¡ (1 ¡ ph)¯A
phI
I) ¡ (1 ¡ ph)A ¸ pl(Y ¡
I ¡ (1 ¡ ph)¯A
phI
I) ¡ (1 ¡ pl)A
A ¸
I(ph ¡ pl) ¡ ph(phX ¡ plY ))
(ph + ¯(1 ¡ ph))(ph ¡ pl)
| {z }
A ¸ f(I; ¹ µ;µi;X;Y )
and Eh(^ I(A)Rh;A) ¸ El(I
¤
l Rl):







X + (1 ¡ ¯)A
¶
¡ 1 = 0
is satis¯ed. Denote the µi satisfying f(I¤; ¹ µ;µi;X;Y ) = 0 as ~ µ. Then, we can state the
following:
Proposition 1. Entrepreneurs of type µi 2 (^ µ; ~ µ) without private assets A are ¯nancially
constrained in equilibrium, that is I < I¤.
Consider the benchmark type ^ µ. Such entrepreneurs own project qualities l and
h that yield the same expected gross return. However, due to l's higher probability of
default, the bank's needed return rate to break even, R, is lower in the case of h for every
amount of I > 0. For any I > 0, condition C3 part (1) is violated and an entrepreneur
of type ^ µ would cheat. The entrepreneur would take the contract hRhIi, if o®ered, but
realizes quality l. As the bank expects losses from such a contract for all positive loan
sizes, it denies ¯nancing at all and ¯nancial constraints C are maximal, C = I¤¡0 = I¤.
However, the bank can break even and o®er some positive amount of credit if it o®ers
only the contract hRlI¤
l i. The strategy of restricting itself to the break-even contract for
7the low quality hRlI¤
l i eases C to C = I¤ ¡ I¤
l > 0. Entrepreneurs only realize quality l
but achieve positive earnings.
The cheating incentive in case of the contract hRhIi is only weakened if quality h be-
comes better, that is µi increases. A higher ability induces Eh(^ IRh) to rise but El(I¤
l Rl)
stays constant. Thus, there exists a certain level ¸ µ where both pro¯ts are equal. For all
entrepreneurial abilities higher than ¸ µ, ¯nancial constraints relax monotonically, that is
C = I¤ ¡ ^ I shrinks and eventually approaches zero as µi approaches ~ µ. These ¯nancial
constraints deter entrepreneurs of type µi 2 (^ µ; ~ µ) from achieving their optimal invest-
ment level, and reduce their probability of success.
Proposition 2. For any given type µi 2 (¸ µ; ~ µ) the entrepreneur's probability of survival
increases with pledged assets A. For any given type µi 2 (^ µ; ¸ µ) the probability of survival
increases if the pledged assets A are large enough.
Private assets securing debt cause a dead weight loss of (1¡¯)A for project variant h
and (1¡
(1¡ph)pl
(1¡pl)ph ¯)A for variant l if liquidated. As banks only participate if they are able
to break even, the entrepreneurs have to bear the additional cost. The cost arises with
probability 1¡pj. That is, the expected loss caused by pledging private assets are higher
with quality l than with quality h. By securing debt, the entrepreneur renders quality l
less attractive and lowers his motive for cheating. Consequently, banks are prepared to
give higher loans if private assets can be pledged. For the higher ability range µi 2 (¸ µ; ~ µ)
¯nancial constraints C = I¤¡^ I(A) relax monotonically with A: @ C=@ A < 0: Due to the
higher investment I, the entrepreneur's probability of default also decreases. This result
is in line with theoretical predictions of Cressy (2006), who ¯nds that undercapitalized
¯rms have lower survival rates. However, in the low ability range µi 2 (^ µ; ¸ µ) a relaxation
of ¯nancial constraints occurs only if A is large enough to push the crucial investment
^ I(A) to such an amount that Eh(Rh^ I(A);A) > El(RlI¤
l ).
Period 2
8In period 2 the successful entrepreneurs apply again for ¯nancing. Due to their con-
tinuing relationship, banks have acquired an additional option, which enables them to
screen out the l-quality at a cost S. With a perfectly competitive loan market, banks
would o®er to screen projects as a service to entrepreneurs, who would then bear the
cost of screening. Note that entrepreneurs who adopt a second period loan contract
from a screening bank will never be prepared to pledge private assets. If a bank does
not intend to screen their clients, it will serve them unscreened.
The participation constraint of the bank with screening is I + S = ph(µi;I)RI. In
this case, ¯nancial constraints are not binding anymore, and the entrepreneur invests
optimally. I = I¤ yields an expected pro¯t of ES
h = ph(µi;I¤)X ¡ I¤ ¡ S: Thus, the
equilibrium screening condition will be the following:
C5: Screening. ES
h(I¤RS
h(I¤)) ¸ Eh(IRh;A) = El(IRh;A).
Denote the cost level that satis¯es ES
h(I¤RS
h(I¤)) = Eh(IRh;A) = El(IRh;A) as ¹ S.
Then, C5 leads to
Proposition 3. If banks are su±ciently e±cient in screening, S · ¹ S, private assets
will not be pledged. Therefore they do not determine the probability of a ¯rm's success
anymore. If banks possess a low screening e±ciency, S > ¹ S, assets continue to determine
the ¯rm's success probability.
Suppose that the entrepreneur owns a ¯xed amount of private assets ¹ A. The selection
of the screening option implies an additional cost of S with certainty, whereas the non-
screening option forces the entrepreneur to bear both the expected dead weight loss
resulting from the liquidation of assets and the cost of suboptimal investment, I < I¤.
The screening option will be selected if S is below the sum of the two loss components. As
these costs are ¯xed for a given level of assets, and ES
h(I¤RS
h(I¤)) continuously decreases
with S there must exist an S = ¹ S( ¹ A) in which screening and non-screening options
yield the same expected pro¯ts. The screening option is superior to the non-screening
option for all S below this level, S · ¹ S( ¹ A). In this e±ciency range, banks abandon the
security. Consequently assets will no longer in°uence the ¯rm's probability of success.
9If the e±ciency level is too low, S > ¹ S, the screening option will be dropped and the
probability of success remains dependent on pledgable assets.8
Empirical Implications. The most important empirical implication is the positive
relationship between the availability of assets and the probability of survival. If moral
hazard is present in the sense that entrepreneurs are constantly inclined to gamble for a
higher pro¯t at the expense of the external ¯nancier, availability of assets increases the
probability of success. This phenomenon occurs not only at the start-up point but also
in a later phase of the venture. The transmission channel is the relaxation of ¯nancial
constraints induced by pledging private assets as collateral. Only if banks are highly e±-
cient in screening can the positive relationship between assets and probability of success
cease to exist once the enterprise has been successfully started. A low screening e±-
ciency immediately implies that assets and the probability of survival remain positively
related during the ¯rm's lifetime. However, there is a distinction between the upper and
the lower ability range, µi > ¸ µ and µ 2 (^ µ; ¸ µ) respectively. In the upper range a marginal
increase of pledged assets a®ects the probability of success positively. In the lower range
the amount of assets must be large enough to remove contraints and increase the chance
of survival.
The model also predicts that ceteris paribus ¯nancial constraints would be eased if
the distance between the two project qualities increases. A higher distance occurs if the
entrepreneur's ability improves and/or the gross return of the h-project increases. The
latter is to be expected if the entrepreneur operates in a branch with favorable market
conditions such as a fairly low competition.
Of course there could be other mechanisms that link inheritance to ¯rm survival. For
example, individuals who inherit greater amounts of wealth (for example by inheriting
ongoing businesses) also inherit networks and connections that are important for the
development of the business. In this case inheritance would be a proxy for parents who
had been self-employed, too.9 The driver for survival would be the family tradition of
10self-employment rather than the relaxation of ¯nancial constraints. In the next section
we account for this alternative explanation as well by investigating a speci¯c sample
which contains only entrepreneurs that have no self-employed parents.10
3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.1 Data
To investigate the e®ects of a discrete increase of private assets on the likelihood to sur-
vive as an entrepreneur, we work with the German Socio{Economic Panel (GSOEP).11
It is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households. It provides
information on all household members, consisting of Germans living in the Old and the
New German States, foreigners, and recent immigrants to Germany. The Panel started
in 1984 and we use waves up to 2004. Our initial data set includes over 900,000 individ-
ual year-long observations. In 2004, there were more than 12,000 households, and nearly
24,000 persons were sampled. This survey contains an extensive set of demographic and
household characteristics, including information about labor market status and income.
Thus, it provides both detailed information on entrepreneurs and their socio-economic
environment in addition to information on their ¯rms such as size (in discrete ranges)
and industry.
Empirical testing requires us to de¯ne both inheritance and self{employment as
terms. As in Taylor (1999), we use data collected annually concerning labor market
activity in the periods between interviews. An individual is de¯ned as self-employed if
she considers herself as: a Self-employed farmer, Free-lancer, Self-employed with exactly
nine Coworkers or less, Self-employed with greater than nine Coworkers, or Help In the
Family Business. Inheritance is de¯ned using two types of questions. All waves after
2000 include inheritance indicators. To capture the occurrence of inheritance before
2001, we use information from the 2001 questionnaire. It has three questions related
to each of the years of three last inheritances. Based on these sources of inheritance
11information, we generate the inheritance binary and continuous variables, inheritance
and amount. We apply a number of selection criteria to the data. First, we include only
self-employed individuals aged 21-65. Concerning the duration analysis, the duration
variable is the spell of self-employment. In our data, we remove those spells for which
we do not know their exact starting year (left-censoring). We drop all individuals with
multiple spells in the basic sample. After screening we have 1,563 self-employment spells
and 5,353 person-year observations.12
The other variables are constructed as follows. The dummy variable sexit is equal
to one, for females and zero otherwise. The individual's age during the ¯rst year of self-
employment activity is represented by agei1 and age2
i1. Size of the start-up is captured by
size2;i1 (equals to one if entrepreneur has less than ¯ve employees inclusive) and size3;i1
(equals to one if entrepreneur has more than six employees inclusive) dummy variables.
The omitted category is no employees. Individual income at the beginning of self-
employment spell is incomei1. The type of the ¯rm is represented by manufacturingit
and serviceit dummy variables, which represent the manufacturing and services sectors,
respectively, while the agricultural sector is used as a reference group. This grouping of
entrepreneurs is based on the NACE code. Previous unemployment experience is repre-
sented by unemployedi0, which is equal to one if a person switched from unemployment
to self-employment and zero otherwise. The variable marriedit provides information
about the current marital status. It is equal to one if the individual is married and lives
together with the partner and zero otherwise. This variable characterizes whether there
is a rather typical family background. Finally we employ three dummy variables which
re°ect the person's level of education or training (in years). High school education level
is represented by educ2;it, while educ3;it indicates (school) graduation and some type of
apprenticeship and educ4;it is the indicator for university studies.
Means and variances for the annual means of all variables employed in the analysis
are described in Table 1. The mean of lagged inheritance in our person-year data is
merely two percent.
123.2 Econometric Model and Results
In this section we present our estimation results on the link between the hazard of
abandoning self-employment and inheritance. Following Carrasco (1999) and Taylor




where ¸(t) is the base-line hazard, t is duration to date in self-employment, X is the
vector of explanatory variables and ¯ is a vector of parameters which is unknown.13 The
selection of control variables regarding the entrepreneur's ability and business environ-
ment follows the work of Taylor (1999) and Carrasco (1999), subject to data availability
constraints.
Table 2 presents the results from the discrete time hazards model (complementary
log-log). A variable with a positive coe±cient is associated with an increased hazard rate
and a decreased survival time. Every model speci¯cation includes time variant and time
invariant covariates. Variables with the index t = 1 are time invariant and correspond
to values at the ¯rst year of the period. Lagged inheritance has the index t ¡ 1, while
unemployment experience is dated by t = 0. Note that respondents are often reluctant
to report their true amount of wealth. The lower number of observations in column (3)
and (4) re°ects this reluctance.
In order to check robustness of our results with respect to baseline hazard speci¯ca-
tion, we treat the baseline hazard both semi-parametrically and non-parametrically. In
columns (2) and (4), it is a log-baseline hazard model, which is analogous to Weibull
model's shape parameter. In the other columns, non-parametric estimation is employed.
As there are no events in some years, we re-group into four time periods for the sake
of identi¯cation. The baseline hazard in columns (1) and (3) therefore consists of the
following periods: (i) the ¯rst year, (ii) from two to ¯ve years inclusive, (iii) from six to
ten years inclusive, and (iv) more than ten. Meyer (1990) suggests that non-parametric
13estimating of hazard line has advantages comparing to the semi-parametric one. The
former approach provides more useful diagnostics and avoids inconsistent estimation of
covariate coe±cients when the baseline hazard is poorly speci¯ed.
All estimates are consistent with our theoretical predictions. Thus, lagged change in
assets has a positive e®ect on a ¯rm's survival. The sign of lagged inheritance variable
is in line with Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) who, using data on the US, show that receiving
an inheritance increases the probability of business survival. Furthermore, similar to
Cressy (1996b), age as a proxy for entrepreneurial ability is more important than income
at the start of a company. The hazard is a U-shaped function of age, suggesting that
individuals are more likely to quit self-employment activities at young and elderly ages
(Cressy, 1996a). Previous unemployment experience, another proxy for ability, increases
the exit rate from self-employment, which is in line with other ¯ndings. As in Taylor
(1999), marriage and level of education have statistically insigni¯cant e®ects on survival.
Industry e®ects emerge with the lowest rate of survival in the services sector. In line
with Van Praag (2003), start-ups in the agricultural sector have the highest survival
rate. This result points at relatively unfavourable conditions for small-scale businesses
in the service sector and fairly favourable conditions in the agricultural sector.
Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity does not change the conclusions about e®ects
of inheritance.14 The likelihood ratio test of zero unobserved heterogeneity is not rejected
indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is not important. The coe±cients by the lagged
inheritance variable show the same strong e®ect as observed before.
Figure 1 depicts the predicted hazard and survival rate showings the evolution of
a person's risk of failure over time. We observe that a married man aged 40, with a
starting personal income of 5,000 EUR, and who is working in manufacturing sector is
more likely to avoid business failure if he received an inheritance in the previous period.
In order to test the robustness of our qualitative results we have experimented with
samples excluding self-employed farmers and family business helpers; and including per-
sons with multiple spells. In Table 3 columns 1 and 2 report the results for a sample
14of German entrepreneurs which include only 3 categories: Free-lancers, Self-employed
with exactly nine Coworkers or less, and Self-employed with greater than nine Cowork-
ers. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 include also individuals with multiple spells. The
qualitative ¯ndings remain the same as in the basic sample.
As pointed out before inheritance could be a proxy for having one's roots in a family
of self-employed. We apply our estimation equation to a speci¯c sample which comprises
only entrepreneurs that have no self-employed parents to discriminate between the moral
hazard hypothesis and the alternative explanation of having inherited networks and
business expertise. The results are presented in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3. The
negative impact of inheritance on the hazard rate is signi¯cant. This ¯nding supports
our hypothesis that ¯nancial restrictions might be the main causal mechanism.
Finally, there is the possibility that self-employed individuals need similar skills then
employed individuals to succeed. In this case the transition path would reveal distinct
ability levels. The transition from self-employment to unemployment would reveal rela-
tively low occupational skills whereas the transition to wage employment would signal
relatively high skills. The model suggests that assets a®ecting survival is more likely
in the higher ability group. We employ multinominal logit estimates of competing risk
models to capture the di®erences in the survival probabilities between the two distinct
groups. Table 4 report the results of the log-baseline hazard speci¯cations.
The results for the wage employment hazard follow the pattern of single risk models.
However, the downward e®ect of lagged inheritance is only present for entrepreneurs that
transition into employment. It disappears for the unemployment hazard model. This
outcome is compatible with the model provided that the transition path captures indeed
distinct ability ranges. However, given that only a small fraction of the sample switches
out of self-employment into unemployment (99 out of 986), we note the possibility that
the result is only an artifact of data constraints. Interestingly the initial size of the
venture matters for the transition from being an entrepreneur into unemployment but
not for those founders that switch into employment.
154 Conclusions
In 2004 the number of insolvencies in the Western Europe added up to 156,245 in 2004. In
2005 almost 40,000 German ¯rms declared bankruptcy.15 Small-scale German enterprises
are considered particularly fragile due to their assumed lack of investment. Under-
capitalization pervades if ¯rms face ¯nancial constraints not only at their start-up but
also during their lifetime. In this paper we develop a model in which ¯nancial constraints
occur endogenously due to persistent moral hazard. The model predicts that private
assets may positively a®ect the ¯rm's survival by relaxing ¯nancial constraints, not only
when the business is started but also in a later phase. We test the hypothesis that the
survival of small-scale businesses is determined by persistent ¯nancial constraints with
GSOEP data. In doing so, we proxy the release of ¯nancial constraints by inheritance
which has the advantage of not being subject to the entrepreneur's decision.
Provided that we have identi¯ed the main causal mechanism, our principal ¯nding
suggests that ¯nancial restrictions decrease the entrepreneur's survival chance by deter-
ring her from the optimal investment path. The receiving of an inheritance signi¯cantly
increases the survival probability of small-scale businesses. However, the sensitivity
of hazard to inheritance is not signi¯cant for entrepreneurs that transition from self-
employment into unemployment. Surprisingly, the survival probability of this category
of entrepreneurs is higher if the initial ¯rm size is larger.
If our results capture correctly the persistence of ¯nancial constraints then the ¯nd-
ing could indicate that, in the case of small-scale enterprises, the German house-bank
system is not as e®ective in dealing with asymmetric information and moral hazard as
sometimes suggested in the literature. Moreover, the ongoing reliance of small-scale
entrepreneurs on their own funds may signal that German venture capital ¯rms are not
yet prepared to deal with this type of ¯rms. The evidence would then be in line with the
perception that governmental intervention via speci¯c programs meant to improve the
capitalization of the German medium-sized businesses has a role in a policy towards fos-
16tering entrepreneurship in Germany. Of course, it is not to be expected that bureaucrats
would do better than venture capitalists and housebanks in overcoming moral hazard
and asymmetric information. But it should be considered whether public programs that
back the ¯nanciers' dealing with the speci¯c risk of small business ¯nance such as re-
¯nancing credit lines for venture capitalists or public loans granted alongside with the
bank loan could help to weaken ine±ciencies stemming from imperfect capital markets.
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Notes
1Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue on measurement of ¯nancial constraints.
2Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) stress the importance of entrepreneurial ¯rms for innovation.
Moreover, small scale enterprises are said to be crucial for channeling ¯nancial sector reforms into
growth (King and Levine, 1993).
3See also Cressy and Olofsson (1997) and references therein for a comprehensive analysis of small
business ¯nancing in Europe.
4Citation: The Economist, \The loan factory", April 16th, 2005
5Testing for the importance of ¯nancial constraints by using the stock variable wealth is subject to
an endogeneity problem. See e.g. Xu (1998) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004).
6Hurst and Lusardi (2004) argue that inheritance cannot be considered as an exogenous increase of
wealth. They suggest that the time of the windfall relative to the business entry decision is crucial,
and that individuals receiving an inheritance are also more likely to start a business before receiving
an inheritance. We also experiment with current and lead values of inheritance and receive marginally
signi¯cant and insigni¯cant relationships, respectively.
7Certain cash °ows are never achieved: pj(I¤;µ) < 1:
8Note that additional pledgable assets increase the attractiveness of the non-screening option as the
expected pro¯t ¹ Eh(IRh;A), generating indi®erence between the two project qualities, Eh(IRh;A) =
El(IRh;A), increases. A jump in available assets may thus increase ¹ Eh(IRh;A) to such a level that
the screening option is ruled out and banks invest a lower amount of I, I < I¤
S, due to their credit
constraint C = I¤ ¡ I(A). However, a negative jump in the probability of success will never occur if
banks are not e±cient enough in screening.
9We are grateful to the referee for raising that point.
1710A second concern is that inheritance allows individuals to stay in business too long as the ad-
ditional private funds may enable self-employed individuals to cover business expenditures despite
loss-generating operations, or to cover unforeseen expenses which would otherwise threaten the ¯rm's
survival. However, given that individuals are behaving rationally they will employ their inheritance
for improving the survival chances only if the expected net value of such a strategy is positive. If this
is the case and capital markets are perfect, that is, no asymmetric information and moral hazard is
present, banks should be also prepared to ¯nance this period of distress. Thus inheritance should have
no impact. The fact that inheritance is needed to overcome the distress situation is again pointing at
imperfections in the capital markets caused by asymmetric information and moral hazard.
11For a more detailed description of the GSOEP see Lechner (1999) or Constant and Zimmermann
(2006). Alternatively, visit http://www.diw-berlin.de/english/sop/ for a comprehensive data informa-
tion.
12Note that one of our robustness checks is conducted on a sample that includes multiple spells.
13The models are estimated using Stata 9.2 software package. The do-¯les with codes are available
upon request.
14Results are available upon request. The assumptions about a particular parametric distributions
are hard to justify. Hence, we also check the robustness of results using Gaussian distribution for the
unobserved heterogeneity term. The results follow the pattern of the reported estimates. Furthermore,
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20Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For A = 0 both project qualities yield equal pro¯t if




This equality is only satis¯ed with I = 0 for the benchmark type ^ µ. If quality h should
be realized and hRhIi should be o®ered the benchmark type ^ µ faces perfect ¯nancial
constraints. Now, consider projects for which Assumption 1 is satis¯ed. Given that
µi > ^ µ and I = 0 the left hand side of (4) increases. Note, that an increase in I
decreases the left hand side more than the right hand side. Thus, for µi > ^ µ equality in
(4) can be restort with some I = ^ I > 0. Since @Eh(µi;¢)=@µi > 0 the crucial amount
of I that satis¯es (4) increases if µi increases: @^ I=@µi > 0. The monotonicity of the
relationship between ^ I and µi implies that there exists a µi = ~ µ for which the loan
granted in equilibrium approaches I¤, and ¯nancial constraints vanish. The second step
of the proof takes the possibility into account that the bank could alternatively o®er
only contract hRlI¤
l i. Note that the optimal I in case of hRlI¤






Y ¡ 1 = 0 (5)






X ¡ 1 = 0:
Thus ¯nancial constraint C = I¤ ¡I¤
l arises if banks, in order to avoid losses, o®er only
hRlI¤
l i. Recall that Eh(^ I) increases monotonically if quality h becomes better. Moreover
El(I¤
l ; ¹ µ) > Eh(^ I; ^ µ) in the benchmark case. Both properties imply that there exists a
crucial level µi = ¸ µ such that El(I¤
l ; ¹ µ) = Eh(^ I;µi). For a rather small di®erence between
l and h, that is ability is in the range of µi 2 (^ µ; ¸ µ), the active ¯nancial constraint is
C = I¤ ¡ I¤
l since the bank only o®ers hRlI¤
l i. For all µi 2 (¸ µ; ~ µ) the active ¯nancial
constraint is C = I¤ ¡ ^ I. q.e.d.
21Proof of Proposition 2. The pro¯t for all µi > ^ µ is given by
Eh = phX ¡ I ¡ (1 ¡ ph)(1 ¡ ¯)A
and
El = plY ¡
pl
ph










for quality h and l respectively. Consider a given type µ with µi 2 (^ µ; ~ µ). For symplicity
we assume ¯ = 1. Recall that without private assets the ¯rm is constraint by (4).
If pledgable assets are available the pro¯t function for quality l is lowered but the
pro¯t function for quality h remains unchanged. This feature in combination with (4)
immediately implies
phX ¡ I ¡ (1 ¡ ph)(1 ¡ ¯)A = plY ¡
pl
ph










only for I = ^ I(A > 0) > ^ I(A = 0): The lowering of El induces Eh(^ I(A > 0);A) >
Eh(^ I;A = 0) for all ^ I(A > 0) 2 (^ I(A = 0);I¤). With ¯ < 1 both pro¯t functions are
lowered if debt is secured. However, because of (1 ¡ ph)pl=(1 ¡ pl)ph < 1 the decrease
for pro¯t El is always larger than the decrease for Eh. This feature in combination
with the fact that Eh(^ I(A > 0);A) increases with ^ I(A > 0) for ¯ = 1 guarantees that
Eh(^ I(A > 0);A) also increases for ¯ = 1¡±, where ± is not too large. Thus the pledging
of assets is compatible with C2. It increases pro¯ts as it allows a greater I. However,
for types µi 2 (^ µ; ¸ µ) the increase in pro¯ts has to be large enough to excell El(Rl I¤
l ) if
assets should ease ¯nancial constraints. q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider S = 0. In this case ES
h(I¤;S = 0) > Eh = El since
investment incentives are not distorted in case of the screening option, and the pledging
of assets in the non screening case reduces the pro¯t Eh as the entrepreneur has to bear



















= ¡1 < 0: (7)
22The ¯rst derivative (6) indicates that the optimal investment level I¤ is independent of
S. The second derivative (7) shows that the maximal pro¯t decreases monotonically
with S. For a given type the amount of plegded assets A determines investment and
pro¯t in the non-screening scenario. Both properties and ES
h(I¤;S = 0) > Eh = El
ensure that for each given amount of pledged assets there exists a level ¹ S such that C5
is satis¯ed for all S < ¹ S. In this array of S the available amount of assets will not be
pledged. Thus, assets have no in°uence on the ¯rms' success probability. If S > ¹ S, C5
is not satis¯ed. Assets secure the debt and Proposition 2 applies. q.e.d.
23Table 1: Sample statistics
Variable De¯nition ¹ ¾2 N
inheritancei;t¡1 Equals one if inheritance in previous period 0.02 0.02 5248
amounti;t¡1 Amount of inheritance in previous period,
1,000 EUR
2.11 53.07 3917
sexit Equals one if female 0.36 0.23 5353
agei1 Age at the beginning of spell 36.91 69.25 5353
educ2;it Equals one if high school education only 0.60 0.24 5353
educ3;it Equals one if (school) graduation and ap-
prenticeship
0.14 0.12 5353
educ4;it Equals one if university education 0.16 0.14 5353
size2;i1 Equals one if less than ¯ve employees inclu-
sive
0.28 0.20 4874
size3;i1 Equals one if more than six employees in-
clusive
0.29 0.21 4874
incomei1 Log of labor earnings at the beginning of
spell
9.45 1.26 4625
unemployedi0 Equals one if unemployed before self-
employment
0.15 0.13 5353
marriedit Equals one if married 0.70 0.21 5353
manufit Equals one if activity in manufacturing sec-
tor
0.07 0.06 5353
servicesit Equals one if activity in services 0.52 0.25 5353
Note: ¾2 and ¹ represent variance and mean respectively.
24Table 2: Cloglog estimates of survival function





sexit 0.0168 0.0016 0.0442 0.0153
(0.0910) (0.0906) (0.1111) (0.1102)
agei1 -0.0867** -0.1011** -0.0896* -0.1054**
(0.0412) (0.0415) (0.0492) (0.0494)
age2
i1 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.0015** 0.0017***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
educ2;it -0.0545 -0.0784 -0.0748 -0.1235
(0.1373) (0.1382) (0.1799) (0.1794)
educ3;it 0.1808 0.1692 0.1020 0.0713
(0.1616) (0.1623) (0.2047) (0.2041)
educ4;it 0.1362 0.1366 0.0612 0.0450
(0.1590) (0.1591) (0.2058) (0.2051)
size2;i1 0.0969 0.0801 0.1365 0.1091
(0.0961) (0.0957) (0.1139) (0.1133)
size3;i1 -0.1126 -0.0702 -0.1745 -0.1198
(0.0973) (0.0963) (0.1230) (0.1219)
incomei1 0.0478 0.0363 0.0276 0.0081
(0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0513) (0.0511)
unemployedi0 0.4053*** 0.3896*** 0.3945*** 0.3694***
(0.1046) (0.1048) (0.1307) (0.1307)
marriedit -0.0836 -0.0968 -0.0909 -0.1139
(0.0853) (0.0847) (0.1038) (0.1033)
manufacturingit 0.8998*** 0.9313*** 1.4513*** 1.4905***
(0.1661) (0.1647) (0.2148) (0.2142)
servicesit 1.1266*** 1.1513*** 1.7143*** 1.7485***
(0.1004) (0.0998) (0.1467) (0.1462)
N 4,082 4,082 3,132 3,132
Nonparametric baseline yes no yes no
Log likelihood -1703.5001 -1718.9532 -1151.1593 -1163.2939
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. Regressions include constant. * signi¯cant at 10%; **
signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
25Table 3: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
inheritancei;t¡1 -1.0183** -1.0813** -1.0158** -1.0833** -0.8678** -0.9373**
(0.5061) (0.5092) (0.4477) (0.4441) (0.4408) (0.4353)
sexit 0.0043 0.0163 -0.1007 -0.0920 -0.0130 -0.0004
(0.0909) (0.0909) (0.0786) (0.0795) (0.0919) (0.0925)
agei1 -0.1481*** -0.1374*** -0.0871** -0.0727** -0.1052*** -0.0921**
(0.0424) (0.0420) (0.0351) (0.0358) (0.0399) (0.0405)
age2
i1 0.0023*** 0.0021*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0017*** 0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
educ2;it -0.0893 -0.0706 -0.0120 0.0023 -0.0644 -0.0419
(0.1432) (0.1426) (0.1196) (0.1175) (0.1361) (0.1330)
educ3;it 0.1806 0.1878 0.2162 0.2282 0.1927 0.2055
(0.1662) (0.1655) (0.1424) (0.1426) (0.1611) (0.1604)
educ4;it 0.1518 0.1457 0.2821** 0.2805** 0.1541 0.1535
(0.1618) (0.1619) (0.1368) (0.1370) (0.1548) (0.1539)
size2;i1 0.0864 0.1040 0.0526 0.0660 0.0662 0.0780
(0.0982) (0.0986) (0.0812) (0.0814) (0.0916) (0.0914)
size3;i1 -0.0567 -0.0905 -0.2433*** -0.2751*** -0.0729 -0.1105
(0.0979) (0.0986) (0.0843) (0.0878) (0.0981) (0.1024)
incomei1 0.0223 0.0302 -0.0117 -0.0041 0.0323 0.0408
(0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0422) (0.0424)
unemployedi0 0.4370*** 0.4522*** 0.2487*** 0.2647*** 0.3726*** 0.3858***
(0.1069) (0.1067) (0.0877) (0.0872) (0.1095) (0.1091)
marriedit -0.0847 -0.0655 -0.0747 -0.0698 -0.1252 -0.1140
(0.0857) (0.0866) (0.0766) (0.0778) (0.0851) (0.0862)
manufacturingit 0.9512*** 0.9160*** 1.0027*** 0.9683*** 0.9322*** 0.9048***
(0.1726) (0.1740) (0.1426) (0.1460) (0.1683) (0.1707)
servicesit 1.2285*** 1.2032*** 1.2159*** 1.1963*** 1.1184*** 1.0996***
(0.1052) (0.1059) (0.0868) (0.0876) (0.0974) (0.0988)
N 3,841 3,841 5,856 5,856 3,919 3,919
Nonparametric no yes no yes no yes
baseline
Log likelihood -1618.82 -1606.19 -2226.75 -2210.42 -1674.13 -1661.16
Family business, no no yes yes yes yes
or farmers
Multiple spells no no yes yes no no
Self-employed yes yes yes yes no no
parents
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. Regressions include constant. * signi¯cant at 10%; **
signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
26Table 4: Multinominal Logit Estimates of Competing Risk Model
(1) (2)





sexit -0.0038 -0.0997 -0.0002 -0.1762
(0.1020) (0.2836) (0.1248) (0.3112)
agei1 -0.1056** 0.1335 -0.1073* 0.2344
(0.0453) (0.1353) (0.0555) (0.1539)
age2
i1 0.0018*** -0.0013 0.0018** -0.0024
(0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0019)
educ2;it -0.1093 -0.3347 -0.1603 -0.1824
(0.1533) (0.3794) (0.2025) (0.4587)
educ3;it 0.1656 -0.3312 0.0645 -0.0171
(0.1802) (0.4774) (0.2310) (0.5399)
educ4;it 0.1253 -0.3825 0.0178 -0.2073
(0.1770) (0.4879) (0.2318) (0.5644)
size2;i1 0.0922 -0.2901 0.1243 -0.3830
(0.1076) (0.2924) (0.1281) (0.3173)
size3;i1 -0.0944 -0.8582** -0.1374 -0.7293*
(0.1074) (0.3428) (0.1358) (0.3755)
incomei1 0.0301 -0.2881*** -0.0113 -0.3634***
(0.0458) (0.1091) (0.0572) (0.1210)
unemployedi0 0.4549*** 0.5062* 0.4447*** 0.5555*
(0.1190) (0.2886) (0.1495) (0.3102)
marriedit -0.1100 0.0311 -0.1163 0.2299
(0.0965) (0.2874) (0.1164) (0.3204)
manufacturingit 1.0147*** 0.4688 1.5894*** 0.3514
(0.1812) (0.5158) (0.2322) (0.5774)
servicesit 1.2598*** 0.5391* 1.8860*** 0.4965
(0.1063) (0.2885) (0.1536) (0.3158)
N 4082 3132
Log-likelihood -2029.9870 -1420.9569
Note: Regressions include constant. Semiparametric baseline. Robust standard errors are reported in
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Figure 1: Discrete hazard and survival functions for a married male, aged 40, with
pre-sample income of 5,000 EUR, and working in manufacturing sector.
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